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ABSTRACT
Recently bail reform issues have been in the news across the country, as
concerns about fair treatment of defendants and possible public safety risks from
expanding pretrial release have collided. These issues involve important empirical
questions, including whether releasing more defendants before trial leads to
additional crimes. An opportunity to investigate this public safety issue has
developed in Chicago, our nation’s second largest city. There, the Office of the
Chief Judge of the Cook County Courts adopted new bail reform measures in
September 2017 and reviewed them empirically in May 2019. Cook County’s Bail
Reform Study concluded that the new procedures had released many more
defendants before trial without any concomitant increase in crime. This article
disputes the Study’s conclusions. This article explains that, contrary to the Study’s
assertions, the new changes to pretrial release procedures appear to have led to a
substantial increase in crimes committed by pretrial releasees in Cook County.
Properly measured and estimated, after more generous release procedures were put
in place, the number of released defendants charged with committing new crimes
increased by 45%. And, more concerning, the number of pretrial releasees charged
with committing new violent crimes increased by an estimated 33%. In addition, as
reported by the Chicago Tribune, the Study’s data appears to undercount the
number of releasees charged with new violent crimes; and a substantial number of
aggravated domestic violence prosecutions prosecutors dropped after the changes,
presumably because batterers were able to more frequently obtain release and
intimidate their victims into not pursuing charges. These public safety concerns call
into question whether the bail “reform” measures implemented in Cook County
were cost-beneficial. And because Cook County’s procedures are state-of-the-art
and track those being implemented in many parts of the country, Cook County’s
experience suggests that other jurisdictions may similarly be suffering increases in
crime due to bail reform.
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DOES BAIL REFORM INCREASE CRIME?
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY
IMPLICATIONS OF BAIL REFORM IN COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
Paul G. Cassell ∗ & Richard Fowles ∗∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

Bail reform issues have recently been in the news across the country.
Reformers and their critics have argued about the ways to make the nation’s pretrial
release procedures fairer while at the same time protecting the public from crimes
from released defendants. 1 Reformers have claimed that traditional cash bail
requirements for pretrial release needlessly incarcerate many indigent individuals
merely because they are unable to raise the required sums. And, the critique
continues, those incarcerated are mostly poor and disproportionately black or
Hispanic—individuals who are presumed to be innocent and could often be released
before trial without jeopardizing public safety. 2 In light of that widely accepted
criticism, many jurisdictions have experimented with new procedures that reduce
the use of cash bail as a requirement for a defendant’s release and, more broadly,
that lead to the release of more defendants before trial.
Bail reform critics have responded that the expanded release of defendants
leads to an increase in crime. 3 For example, in New York, more generous pretrial
release procedures have been blamed for an upsurge in crime at the beginning of this
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1
See generally SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK
AT BAIL IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2017).
2
See, e.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, BAIL REFORM:
A GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL POLICY MAKERS (2019), available at
http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/BailReform_WEB.pdf.
3
See, e.g., Jesse McKinley et al., Why Abolishing Bail for Some Crimes Has Law
Enforcement on Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2019; Dan Frosch & Ben Chapman, New Bail
Laws Leading to Release of Dangerous Criminals, Some Prosecutors Say, WALL ST. J., Feb.
10, 2020.
∗
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year. 4 As such reform measures continue to be considered in counties and states
around the nation, arguments about their effects on public safety will likely be at the
forefront public policy debates. 5
An opportunity to empirically assess these public safety issues has recently
developed in Cook County, Illinois—one of the nation’s largest trial court systems
(which includes all of Chicago, the nation’s second largest city). On September 18,
2017, the Chief Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court (Judge Timothy Evans)
implemented sweeping bail reforms by issuing General Order 18.8A (G.O. 18.8A).
The Order was designed to not only reduce reliance on money bail but also increase
pretrial releases in Cook County courts. About a year-and-a-half later, Chief Judge
Evans reviewed the results of these new procedures and published a study entitled
“Bail Reform in Cook County” (which we will refer to as the “Bail Reform Study”). 6
The Study trumpets the fact that the new pretrial reforms led to a significant increase
in the percentage of defendants who were released before trial—from about 72% of
all defendants to about 81% of all defendants. 7 And the Study also argues that this
increase in pretrial releases was accompanied by “considerable stability” in the
“community safety rate” of the releases.8 Specifically, the Study claims that the
new, more generous release procedures did not increase crime, stating that “[i]t
should be noted that the increase in pretrial release has not led to an increase in
crime” 9 and that the changes have “not led to an increase in violent crime in
Chicago.” 10
Such research designed to develop empirical evidence on the effect of new
judicial practices is commendable. Judges may be reluctant to make changes, falling
prey to the same “preferences for the familiar status quo as the rest of us.” 11 Thus,
judges may need prodding to make changes in long-standing procedures, such as
money bail. And yet, it is important that any “reform” measure be a genuine

4
See Ben Chapman & Katie Honan, New York City Police Commissioner Blames New Bail
Law for Rising Crime, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2020
5
See Center on Media, Crime, and Justice, Prosecutors, Legislators Push Back Against Bail
Reform, THE CRIME REPORT (Feb. 11, 2020) (noting bail reform initiatives adopted in more
than 20 states and many counties).
6
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGE, CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, BAIL REFORM
IN COOK COUNTY: AN EXAMINATION OF GENERAL ORDER 18.8A AND BAIL IN FELONY
CASES (2019) (hereinafter BAIL REFORM STUDY).
7
Id. at 24 (“a larger percentage of post-G.O. 18.8A defendants had secured release than their
pre-G.O. 18.8A counterparts (pre = 71.6% vs. post = 80.5%)”).
8
Id. at 33.
9
Id. at 1.
10
Id. at 2.
11
Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 903
(2015).
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improvement. Only if empirical research accurately captures what has happened
after a change in judicial procedures can the reform measure’s value be evaluated. 12
In this article, we explore the public safety implications of the Cook County
changes and specifically the Bail Reform Study’s sanguine conclusions that the new
procedures did not lead to more crimes. While the two of us have differing points
of view on various subjects, we both are committed to empirically assessing such
questions—a pragmatic bent that has led us to team up in the past, 13 including
researching Chicago crime issues. 14 Having carefully reviewed the Bail Reform
Study, we have serious doubts about its upbeat conclusions.
Properly understood, the Study’s data raises significant concerns about what
happened after changes in Cook County’s pretrial release procedures. The Study
fails to recognize that, given that more defendants are being released after the
reforms, even a “stable” rate of community safety will inexorably lead to more
crimes. That stable rate of safety—and, inversely, the stable rate of failure or public
safety danger—applies across a larger pool of released defendants, which
necessarily means that the public suffers additional crimes. In other words, at least
in Cook County, more bail reform apparently means more crimes.
In addition, we find that, contrary to the Study’s suggestion of stability, the
number of crimes committed by pretrial releasees appears to have significantly
increased. Correctly estimated, the number of released defendants charged with
committing new crimes increased by about 45% after G.O. 18.8A’s implementation.
And, more concerning, the number of pretrial releasees charged with new violent
crimes increased by about 33%. In addition, as reported by the Chicago Tribune,
good reasons exist for concluding that these figures on violent crimes committed by
releasees undercounted what really happened after the reforms, including failing to
capture a significant number of additional murders. And finally, as also reported by
the Chicago Tribune, the percentage of aggravated domestic violence prosecutions
that prosecutors dropped increased from 56% before G.O. 18.8A to 70% after. A
reasonable inference is that the increase in dropped cases resulted from batterers
See, e.g., Richard Fowles & Sofia Nyström, Introduction to an Econometric Cost-Benefit
Approach: Utah Cost of Crime, Utah Comm’n on Crim. and Juv. Justice (2012), available at
http://www.justice.utah.gov/Documents/CCJJ/Cost%20of%20Crime/Utah%20Cost%20of
%20Crime%202012%20-%20Methods%20Review%20Cost.pdf..
13
See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year
Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055
(1998); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops? A Review of Fifty
Years of Empirical Evidence of Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 2017 BOST.
U.L. REV. 685 (2017).
14
See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, What Caused the 2016 Chicago Homicide Spike?
An Empirical Examination of the “ACLU Effect” and the Role of Stop and Frisks in
Preventing Gun Violence, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1582.
12
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more frequently obtaining pretrial release and intimidating their victims into not
pursuing charges at trial.
These public safety harms call into question whether the bail reform measures
as implemented in Cook County were cost-beneficial. And because Cook County’s
procedures are state-of-the-art and track those being implemented in many parts of
the country, Cook County’s experience suggests that other jurisdictions may
similarly be suffering increases in crime due to bail reform. Accordingly, our
findings will be useful to policymakers across the country as they consider whether
and how to implement changes in pretrial release procedures.
Our analysis proceeds in several steps. Part II initially describes how pretrial
release procedures have worked in Cook County before the recent reforms and then
after.
Part III reviews the Bail Reform Study’s argument that the expansion in pretrial
releases has not increased the crimes committed in Cook County. Because many
factors apart from pretrial release procedures can affect aggregate crime totals,
looking generally to such aggregations is an inappropriate way for determining G.O.
18.8A’s public safety implications.
Part IV turns specifically to crimes committed by pretrial releasees and
examines data presented in the Bail Reform Study about a “stable” community
safety rate before and after the changes. Examining the issue more closely, we find
that the Study’s data suggest substantial increases in the total number of crimes
committed by pretrial releasees after the implementation of more generous release
procedures, including increases in violent crimes. We also concur with conclusions
of the Chicago Tribune that the Study’s methodology and data significantly
undercount the number of defendants who committed violent crimes after the
changes. Finally, for domestic violence cases, it appears (as first reported by the
Chicago Tribune) that many abusers were able to take advantage of new release
procedures to intimidate their victims into having charges dropped.
Part V then considers how these crime increases might factor into a more
extended cost-benefit analysis assessing Cook County’s reforms. While we are
unable to provide a full cost-benefit analysis, clear reasons exist for thinking that the
recent changes may not have been net beneficial.
Part VI concludes with some implications of our paper for changes in pretrial
release procedures elsewhere. Because the kinds of changes that were made in Cook
County in 2017 are being pursued in other jurisdictions, we caution that public safety
dangers similar to what we found in Cook County may be occurring in these other
jurisdictions as well.
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CHANGES MADE BY THE COOK COUNTY BAIL REFORMS
In this section, we briefly review, first, the changes made to bail procedures by
G.O. 18.8A, 15 and then, second, the conclusions reached by the Bail Reform Study.
By way of historical background, bail reform has long been an issue in Cook
County, with concern about cash bail systems dating back to the early part of the
Twentieth Century. 16 More recently, the critique has been that judges in Cook
County, distrusting information provided by pretrial services, set large cash bonds
as a means of detaining defendants, even defendants who are being held on relatively
minor charges. 17 In October 2016, a class-action lawsuit was filed in Illinois state
court, challenging Cook County’s bail system. 18 While that case was ultimately
dismissed without a decision on the merits, 19 advocacy efforts connected with the
lawsuit lead to new legislation in Illinois, the Bail Reform Act of 2017.20 The Act
encouraged (but not require) expanded use of non-monetary alternatives to cash bail.
In line with the suggestion of the new legislation, on September 18, 2017, Chief
Judge Evans of the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, issued G.O. 18.8A, which
was designed to both reduce the use of cash bail and increase the number of
defendants released before trial. 21 These are two separate issues. While the
shorthand phrase “bail reform” is often used to cover both topics, it is possible to
eliminate cash “bail” while at the same time increasing the number of persons

See generally BAIL REFORM STUDY, supra note 2, at 4–5. A copy of the order can be
found
at
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/Portals/0/Orders/General%20Order%20No.%2018.8a.pdf.
16
See, e.g., ARTHUR L. BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO (1927). Cf. Amos N. Guiora,
Transnational Comparative Analysis of Balancing Competing Interests in CounterTerrorism, 20 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 363, 365 (2006) (discussing denial of bail to
suspected radicals in the early Twentieth Century).
17
See Alexa van Brunt & Locke E. Bowman, Toward a Just Model of Pretrial Release: A
History of Bail Reform and a Prescription for What’s New, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
701, 761-62 (2019).
18
Robinson v. Martin, No. 2016 CH 13587 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2016).
19
Order Granting Section 2-619.1 Motion to Dismiss, Robinson, No. 2016 CH 13587 (filed
June 26, 2017); see also van Brunt & Bowman, supra note 17, at 762; see also Megan
Crepeau, Judge Throws out Proposed Class-Action Lawsuit over Cook County Bond
TRIB.,
June
28,
2019,
available
at
Practices,
CHI.
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-cash-bail-lawsuit-dismissed20180627-story.html.
20
The Bail Reform Act of 2017, S.B. 2034, 100th Gen. Assembly (Ill. 2017).
21
BAIL REFORM STUDY, supra note 2, at 1-6; see also Megan Crepeau, Judges Ordered to
Set Affordable Bonds for Defendants who Pose no Danger, CHI. TRIB., July 17, 2017,
available at https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-cook-county-bail-reformmet-20170717-story.html (visited Jan. 23, 2020).
15
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detained before trial. Bail has simply been the historical device often used as part
of detention decisions.
In this paper, our interest is not in whether Cook County courts reduced or
eliminated cash bail as a means for essentially detaining defendants (and assuring
their appearance at trial). Indeed, we have some sympathy for the argument that
monetary bail is an ineffective mechanism for making such determinations. Instead,
our focus here is on the distinct question of how many persons should be released
pretrial considering the public safety risks associated with placing a suspected
criminal back on the streets.
G.O. 18.8A was designed to expand the pretrial release of defendants awaiting
trial. Chief Judge Evans established a new division within the Circuit Court (the
“Pretrial Division”), which focuses on bail hearings and related determinations in
connection with G.O. 18.8A. Under the new procedures, when a defendant is
arrested, he 22 is first given an initial bail hearing in what is often referred to as a
“bond hearing.” During this hearing, the defendant can argue for release before one
of the pretrial judges who are responsible for determining this issue, including the
type and amount of bond or other conditions of release. 23
In determining release issues, the court must ensure that the kind of bond
imposed will assure the appearance of a defendant in court, the safety of the
community, and compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of release. In
addition to these factors, the court must also consider the facts of the case, the other
requirements of the new Illinois statute, input from the defense and prosecution, and
a public safety assessment (“PSA”). The PSA was created and implemented by
Chief Judge Evans in 2013 with the assistance of the Laura and John Arnold
Foundation and is designed to measure where releasing a defendant before trial is
dangerous to the community. 24
Following an evaluation of all these factors, the pretrial judge can detain a
defendant or allow release based on several different types of bonds, including
release on individual recognizance (an “I-Bond”), a deposit bond, or a cash bond. 25
Additionally, nonmonetary conditions may be imposed with any bail, including (but
not limited to) electronic monitoring and pretrial supervision within the
community. 26

22
For convenience, we use male pronouns in referring to defendants involved in the study,
as more than 80% of the defendants were male. BAIL REFORM STUDY, supra note 2, at 33
(table 7B).
23
Id.
24
Id. at 3.
25
Id. at 4.
26
Id. at 3.
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Although the presumption under G.O. 18.8A is non-monetary pretrial release,
if monetary bail is determined necessary to ensure the defendant’s appearance in
court, the amount of bond required is to be determined based upon the defendant’s
ability to pay and should not serve as an oppressive barrier to pretrial release.
Ultimately, in situations where monetary bail is warranted, it should not be a pretrial
punishment against the defendant and should be affordable. 27
Approximately eighteen months following the implementation of G.O. 18.8A,
in May 2019, the Chief Judge Evans released a 39-page report entitled “Bail Reform
in Cook County.” 28 The Bail Reform Study contained detailed information about
the effects from the changes in pretrial release procedures, including several
conclusions related to the effectiveness of the Order regarding recidivism, jail
populations, and types of bail imposed.
One important conclusion from the Study was that pretrial release of defendants
had expanded significantly under the new procedures. While before G.O. 18.8A
71.6% of felony defendants had secured pretrial release, after the Order 80.5% of
such defendants were released. 29 This meant that in the 15 months before the Order,
20,435 defendants were released while awaiting trial; in the 15 months after the
Order, 24,504 defendants were released—about four thousand more defendants.
The Study explained that mechanism for these additional releases was a significant
increase in individual recognizance releases with a corresponding decrease in the
rate of cash bond releases. 30 Further, the Study noted that when cash bail was
required, the amounts were significantly more affordable. 31 The Study also found
that persons who were released pretrial generally appeared for subsequent court
hearings. 32
Among the various findings announced in the Study, perhaps the most
encouraging was its assertion that the reforms had substantially reduced jail
populations without increasing crime (and particularly violent crime) in Cook
County. The Study claimed that “the increase in pretrial release has not led to an
increase in crime” 33 and that “bail reform has not led to an increase in violent crime
in Chicago.” 34

Id. at 4.
Id.
29
Id. at 24.
30
Id. at 1.
31
Id. at 2.
32
Id. at 30-32. Because our focus is on public safety implications of G.O. 18.8A, we do not
explore this issue of appearance at trial in this article.
33
Id. at 1.
34
Id. at 2.
27
28
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Although the Study generally provided a positive assessment of the reform, the
Study included several caveats. Perhaps the most significant stipulation was that
there remained the need to continually monitor and update the public safety
assessment instrument to ensure that properly measured defendants’ dangerousness
if released. 35 For example, the Study conceded that, following the implementation
of G.O. 18.8A, it appeared that some defendants granted pretrial release were
subsequently arrested on murder charges. 36 The Study explained that using a PSA
as a part of release decisions means using “a probabilistic tool” that “will fail at
times to accurately predict human behavior. When this happens, community
members can be victimized and the Court acknowledges this very unfortunate
possibility.” 37 Nonetheless, the Study concluded, the risk of crimes committed by
pretrial releasees “exists in any criminal justice system that relies on pretrial
release.” 38 The Study concluded that the changes had been, on balance, costbeneficial: G.O. 18.8A had been “associated with positive changes in the process”
because it “allowed more pretrial defendants to remain in their communities pending
resolution of their cases where they can work, pursue education, and support their
families without an increased threat to public safety.” 39
III. THE BAIL REFORM STUDY'S CONCLUSIONS ABOUT LINKAGES TO THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF CRIMES IN COOK COUNTY.
The Bail Reform Study was generally greeted with enthusiasm in Chicago—
particularly the finding that expanded releases did not increase crime. For example,
shortly after the Study’s publication, the Chicago Council of Lawyers distributed a
statement that bail reform “has been a tremendous success.” 40 Noting the public
safety assertions in the Study, the Council of Lawyers argued that releasing “more
pretrial defendants simply [has not] had the harmful effects opponents predicted”
and that “[o]pponents of bail reform who still state that bond reform is dangerous
should be consistently asked to defend their opposition to bond reform in light of
what this data shows us.” 41
We do not count ourselves among the opponents (or proponents) of bail reform.
Instead, our interest is the same as the Chicago Council of Lawyer’s: What the data
show us. Unfortunately, we believe that the reported statistics do not prove what the
Study suggests. In broadly asserting that the data prove that pretrial release reform
Id. at 36.
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
A Policy Statement from Chicago Appleseed and the Chicago Council of Lawyers (June
11, 2019), available at https://chicagocouncil.org/the-data-is-out-bond-reform-in-cookcounty-has-been-a-tremendous-success/ (visited Jan. 23, 2020).
41
Id.
35
36
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did not increase crime in the Chicago area, the Study advances an unsustainable
position.
One fundamental problem is that looking merely at a change in the total number
of crimes after a reform and then attributing the change (or stability) to that single
factor is not how well-regarded criminology studies are conducted. Instead, a
researcher must consider potential confounding variables that might contribute to
any trends.
For example, we recently published a study considering the effects on
Chicago’s crime rates from changes in stop-and-frisk policy that occurred in late
2015. 42 Rather than examine before-and-after crime totals, we ran multiple
regression equations controlling for a variety of factors that have been reported in
the literature to have some association with crimes, including not only the stop-andfrisk variable of interest to us but also temperature, the number of 9-1-1 calls to
police, the Chicago area unemployment rate, homicides in the surrounding areas,
property crime arrests, violent crime arrests, gun arrests, shooting arrests, drug
arrests, and trends over time.43 We then made a qualitative examination of other
possible confounding variables before attempting to reach tentative causal
conclusions. 44 The Bail Reform Study failed to take any of those steps—or even
anything resembling them. 45
The Bail Reform Study’s failure to control for other factors such as these is a
serious problem because parts of the “before” and “after” periods for the study
coincided with an intense effort in Chicago to reduce the crime rates in the wake of
the 2016 Chicago homicide spike. Some tragic history is important to recount here.
In 2016, Chicago garnered unwanted attention for a nearly unprecedented spike in
homicides—a “crushing wave of violence.” 46 More than 750 people were killed in
Chicago in 2016, the highest number of homicides the city experienced in nearly 20
years. 47 In fact, in the previous nine years, Chicago’s yearly homicides were between
See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 14.
See id. at 1613-18.
44
See id. at 1618-43.
45
The study also asserts that public safety was protected under G.O. 18.8A because there
was an increase in “no bail orders” under the new procedures. BAIL REFORM STUDY, supra
note 6, at 2. But this appears to have been a mere procedural change regarding the way in
which defendants were detained. Previously it appears that many presumptively dangerous
defendants were, as a practical matter, detained through the setting of high bail figures. See
id. at 22 (Table 3B) (noting substantially higher bond amounts imposed before G.O. 18.8A).
46
The Chicago Lessons That Chicago Has to Relearn, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 25, 2016, at 22 2016
WLNR 29152627.
47
Azadeh Ansari & Rosa Flores, Chicago’s 762 Homicides in 2016 is Highest in 19 Years,
CNN (Jan. 2, 2017 22:20 GMT), http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/01/us/chicago-murders2016/index.html.
42
43
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400 and 500. 48 In January 2017, the television program 60 Minutes aired “Crisis in
Chicago,” in which the program’s correspondent recounted, “In the six days we were
in Chicago, 55 people were shot, 16 were killed. We were struck by just how routine
it all felt. The dead and wounded were removed with grim efficiency—right down
to the hazmat crews that cleaned away the blood. Murder seemed almost normal.” 49
On the last day of that bloody year, hundreds of Chicagoans marched down
Michigan Avenue (Chicago’s “Magnificent Mile”), carrying more than 750 crosses,
each numbered to represent where each death fell in the year’s homicide count.50
This history has a potential impact on the Bail Reform Study. The “before”
period in the study is the fifteen months of July 1, 2016, through September 30,
2017. Thus, a significant part of the “before” period (July through December 2016)
coincides with a dramatic increase in homicides and shootings in Chicago—the
Chicago homicide spike. 51
As a result of that spike, federal, state, and local authorities all brought to bear
important crime-fighting measures, mostly starting in around the first half of 2017
and continuing through 2018. 52 For example, Mayor Rahm Emanuel hired hundreds
of new police officers in 2017 and 2018. In June 2017, the Illinois Legislature
passed a law increasing sentences for repeat gun offenders. In 2017, the federal
government deployed many new ATF (Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) agents and
federal prosecutors in Chicago increasingly focused on gun crimes. In 2017, new
“shot-stopper” technology was also deployed in Chicago’s high crime
neighborhoods. And a Partnership for Safe and Peaceful Communities was formed
that committed $75 million toward reducing gun violence in Chicago. 53
Fortunately, it appears that all of these efforts, in combination, had at least some
success in reducing Chicago’s homicide and shooting crimes, reductions that

Ray Sanchez & Jason Hanna, Chicago Police Tout 14% Homicide Drop, and Concede
There’s More To Do, CNN, Dec. 1, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/01/us/chicagohomicide-shooting-statistics/index.html.
49
Chicago’s Crime Epidemic: How You Can Help, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 2017, at 16, 2017
WLNR 234998.
50
Marwa Eltagouri, Crosses Witness to Those Killed in 2016, CHI TRIB., Jan. 1, 2017, at 13,
2017 WLNR 35661.
51
See Cassell & Fowles, supra note 14, at 1595-96.
52
See id. at 1639-42.
53
Inquirer Editorial Board, Important lessons for Philadelphia from Chicago’s Three-Year
Decline in Gun Violence, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 10, 2020, available at
https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/editorials/chicago-homicides-decline-gun-violenceshootings-philadelphia-20200110.html; see also PSPC – Partnership for Safe and Peaceful
Communities, https://safeandpeaceful.org/about-us/.
48
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coincided with the adoption of changes to pretrial release policies. 54 Without any
effort to control for these other factors that likely reduced crime in Chicago more
extensively during the “after” period than the “before” period, it would be
unreasonable to assert that pretrial release changes did not affect crime in Chicago.
Also, it is well known that violent crime in Chicago (and many other large cities
in cold weather climates) exhibits “seasonality”—that is, more violent crimes occur
in the warmer months than in the colder months. Our previous paper on the Chicago
homicide spike, for example, contained this graph showing the monthly data for
shooting deaths in Chicago over five years, including 2016 (the year of the spike). 55
As is readily apparent, during the “summer” months (i.e., June, July, and August)
the number of shootings can be as much as three times higher (or even more)
compared to the number committed during winter months.

Source: Chicago Police Department Data
See generally Cassell & Fowles, supra note 14, at 1639-42 (discussing homicide decline
in Chicago in 2017 and noting multiple factors, such as those discussed in the previous
paragraph, that were likely responsible).
55
Id. at 1591 (Figure 3).
54
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As we explained in our earlier paper, the standard explanation for these cyclical
variations is that crime data exhibit “seasonality,” with more crimes committed in
the warmer months than in the colder months. Good empirical support exists for
this explanation, 56 particularly given that some studies find that crime seasonality is
stronger in cities with colder climates, 57 a group which includes Chicago. The
connection between crime and weather, however, is not always perfect. 58 For
instance, an analysis of Chicago crime data by the Chicago Tribune concluded that
while frequency for several crimes increased with temperature, homicides did not. 59
The fact that the Bail Reform Study includes more warm weather months in the
fifteen-month “before” period than in the fifteen-month “after” period would
artificially depress the number of crimes committed in the after period, potentially
obscuring any increase in crime due to the pretrial release changes. In particular,
the “before” period was July 1, 2016 through September 30, 2017; the “after” period
was October 1, 2017, through December 31, 2018. 60 Thus the “before” period
includes five of the most high-crime months; the “after” period includes only three
of the most-high crimes months. An apples-to-apples comparison would be to use
See, e.g., Craig A. Anderson, Heat and Violence, CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI.
33 (2001) (concluding hot temperatures increase violence directly by increasing feelings of
hostility); Gerhard J. Falk, The Influence of the Seasons on the Crime Rate, 43 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 199, 212 (1952) (violent crimes consistently reach the maximum frequency
in the summer, but criminal homicides can be higher in December than in June and August);
Brian Jacobs et al., The Dynamics of Criminal Behavior: Evidence from Weather Shocks, 42
J. HUM. RESOURCES 489 (2007) (finding that weather, and particularly temperature, is
strongly correlated with violent crime); Shannon J. Linning et al., Crime Seasonality:
Examining the Temporal Fluctuations of Property Crime in Cities with Varying Climates,
61 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 1866 (2017); see also Andrew W.
Lehren & Al Baker, In New York, Number of Killings Rises with Heat, N.Y. TIMES, June 18,
2009 (qualitatively concluding that more homicides occur in New York during the summer),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/19/nyregion/19murder.html.
57
See, e.g., J.R. Hipp et al., Crimes of Opportunity or Crimes of Emotion? Testing Two
Explanations of Seasonal Change in Crime, 82 SOC. FORCES 13333 (2004); Linning et al.,
supra note 56, at 1884–88; D. McDowall et al., Seasonal Cycles in Crime, and their
Variability, 28 J. QUAN. CRIMINOLOGY 389 (2012).
58
See, e.g., Ellen G. Cohn, Weather and Crime, 30 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY. 51 (1990) (finding
that while assaults tend to increase with temperature, at least up to 85º, the relationship for
homicides is uncertain).
59
Mowafak Allaham & Ryan Marx, Does a Hot Summer Mean More Crime? Here’s What
the Data Show, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 23, 2017, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/data/ctcrime-heat-analysis-htmlstory.html; see also Dean DeChiaro, Does Chicago’s Homicide
Rate Rise and Fall with Cold Winter Weather?, MEDILL REP. CHI., Feb. 5, 2015,
http://news.medill.northwestern.edu/chicago/does-chicagos-homicide-rate-rise-and-fallwith-cold-winter-weather-2/.
60
BAIL REFORM STUDY, supra note 6, at 1.
56
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twelve-months both before and after. Unfortunately, the Study’s presentation of its
data does not readily permit us to undertake such a reanalysis.
Finally, an even more important point about the Study’s conclusion that crime
rates did not increase after bail reform is that pretrial releasees are only a part of the
crime problem. Persons not on pretrial release commit many significant crimes.
Without a better understanding of what fraction of crimes are committed by pretrial
releasees, it would be difficult to draw firm conclusions about linkages between total
crimes in Cook County and changes to pretrial release procedures.
IV. THE BAIL REFORM STUDY'S CONCLUSIONS ABOUT CRIMES COMMITTED BY
PRETRIAL RELEASEES
Because of the problems just discussed, it is difficult to look simply at the total
number of crimes in Cook County and then draw firm conclusions about the effects
of bail reform on public safety. One would need more refined analysis to make
reliable conclusions.
But an alternative way of measuring the impact of bail reform on public safety
avoids most of these difficulties—a method which the Bail Reform Study implicitly
adopts. Instead of tabulating all the crimes committed in Cook County, it is possible
instead to drill down just into the subset of crimes committed by pretrial releasees. 61
The Study attempts to do this, collecting data and then asserting that there was no
“increased threat to public safety” as a result of changes made by G.O. 18.8A. 62
In this Part, we examine whether the Study’s assertion is true. On closer
examination, we find that both the number of crimes and the number of violent
crimes committed by pretrial releasees appears to have substantially increased after
G.O. 18.8A, contrary to the Study’s assertions. In addition, it appears that the Study
We follow the same approach as the authors of the Bail Reform Study in using a new arrest
as an indicator that a new crime was committed. We recognize, of course, that someone who
is re-arrested is legally presumed to be innocent. But for purposes of determining danger to
public safety, a re-arrest is a commonly used measure of recidivism. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT.
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS
RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010 at 1 (2014) (measuring
recidivism by re-arrest rates); see also id. at 14 (discussing other measure of recidivism in
addition to re-arrest rates). Using re-arrest as indicating that a new crime has been committed
is the conventional approach to measuring reoffending used by other researchers in this area.
See, e.g., Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497,
513-24 (2012) (reviewing previous research on predictions of violence in other pretrial
release studies). Indeed, because only a fraction of criminals committing crimes are arrested,
this approach significantly undercounts the actual costs of crimes committed by pretrial
releasees. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
62
BAIL REFORM STUDY, supra note 6, at 36.
61
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has undercounted the number of crimes committed by pretrial releasees. Finally, the
Study has failed to capture all costs to public safety from the changes, particularly
in the area of domestic violence.
A.

Crimes Committed by Pretrial Releasees Appear to Have Increased After
Pretrial Release Was Expanded.

The Bail Reform Study sought to compare crimes committed by pretrial
releasees during the fifteen months before G.O. 18.8A and the fifteen months after.
As discussed above, difficulties exist with such an approach, such as confounding
influences from rising or falling overall crime rates. But even simply adopting this
approach, the Study’s data suggests that, contrary to the Study’s assertions, the
pretrial release changes likely placed Cook County’s public at greater risk of crimes
from pretrial releasees.
The Bail Reform Study reported figures for the number of defendants who
“remained crime-free” in both the fifteen months before G.O. 18.8A and the fifteenmonths after—i.e., the number of defendants who were not charged in Cook County
for another crime after their initial bail hearing date. 63 Based on this data, the Study
concluded that “considerable stability” existed in “community safety rates”
comparing the pre- and post-implementation periods. 64 Indeed, the Study
highlighted “community safety rates” that were about the same (or even better)
following G.O. 18.8A’s implementation. The Study reported, for example, that the
“community safety rate” for male defendants who were released improved from
81.2% before to 82.5% after; and for female defendants, the community safety rate
improved from 85.7% to 86.5%. 65 Combining the male and female figures produces
the result that the overall community safety rate improved from 81.8% before
implementation of the changes to 83.0% after.
But while the concept of a “community safety rate” might be useful in other
contexts, it is not necessarily the best measure for effects on public safety of changes
in pretrial release policies. When it comes to public safety, the public is concerned
about the number of crimes that released defendants commit in the community, not
a safety “rate” that can vary depending on the denominator.
A simple illustration will prove this point. Suppose that a community
implements changes to pretrial release procedures such that (as in Cook County)
more defendants are released before trial—but the “community safety rate” remains
stable. If the community releases 100 defendants before the changes and 150
defendants after the changes, with a stable “community safety rate” of 80%, then
63
64
65

Id. at 33; see id. at 30 n.16 (defining “community safety rate”).
Id.
Id. at 33 (Table 7B).
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that community will suffer more crime after the changes. Specifically, the total
number of crimes suffered will increase from 20 crimes before the change to 30
crimes after the change. 66
Turning from this simple illustration to the data reported in the Bail Reform
Study, the number of defendants released pretrial increased from 20,435 in the
“before” period to 24,504 in the “after” period—about a 20% increase. So even
though the “community safety rate” remained roughly stable (and even improved
very slightly), the total number of crimes committed by pretrial releasees increased
after G.O. 18.8A. In the fifteen months before G.O.18.8A, 20,435 defendants were
released 67 and 16,720 remained “crime-free” 68—and, thus, arithmetically (although
this number is not directly disclosed in the Study), 3,715 defendants were charged
with committing new crimes while they were released. In the fifteen months after
G.O. 18.8A, 24,504 defendants were released, 69 and 20,340 remained “crimefree” 70—and, thus, arithmetically, 4,164 defendants were charged with committing
new crimes while they were released. Directly comparing the before and after
numbers shows a clear increase from 3,715 defendants who were charged with
committing new crimes before to 4,164 after—a 12% increase.
While one can debate whether a 12% rise in the number of crimes is
significant, the growth contradicts the study’s assertion that crime did not increase
after G.O. 18.8A. Moreover, it turns out that this figure understates the number of
additional crimes that likely occurred during the “after” period. The Bail Reform
Study acknowledged that defendants with initial bail hearings before the changes
spent significantly more time released into the community than defendants from the
post-implementation period—an average of 243 days before compared to 154 days
after. 71 The reason for these differing time periods is not a real-world difference
between the two populations but merely an artifact of the Study’s construction. The
Study’s authors decided to report data on the “after” period very rapidly—and, as a
consequence of this methodology, the authors reported data before the cases in the
after period had fully run their course. The fifteen-month “after” period in the Study
This simple illustration assumes that the community has not had any significant change
in population between the before and after period. This assumption appears to be roughly
correct for Cook County, Illinois, during the 30-month period of time in which G.O. 18.8A
was studied, where recent year-to-year population changes have been declines of a little
under 0.5%. See http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-counties/il/cook-county-population/
(visited Jan. 24, 2020).
67
17,431 males + 3,004 females = 20,435 total defendants released. See BAIL REFORM
STUDY, supra note 6, at 33 (Table 7B).
68
14,146 males + 2,574 females = 16,720 crime free released defendants. See id.
69
21,326 males + 3,178 females = 24,504 total defendants released. See id.
70
17,591 crime-free males + 2,749 crime-free females = 20,340 total crime-free defendants.
See id.
71
Id. at 30.
66
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ended on December 31, 2018, and the Study closed its analysis of those released
defendants just two months later (on February 28, 2019). 72 In contrast, the fifteenmonth “before” period in the study ended on September 30, 2017—and the study
continued its analysis of those defendants for a much longer time. For example, a
defendant who was released on the last day of the before period would have been
reviewed for seventeen months to determine if he was re-arrested; in contrast, a
defendant who was released on the last day of the after period would have been
reviewed for just two months to determine if he was re-arrested. 73
It appears to be generally accepted that the longer a criminal defendant is free
on the streets, the greater the possibility that the defendant will commit a crime—
i.e., will recidivate. While there does not appear to be a great deal of literature on
specific times frames for recidivism by pretrial releasees, the empirical literature on
recidivism by prison releasees consistently shows that the longer time over which
recidivism is observed, the greater the chance of finding recidivism. For example,
a study measuring recidivism over a one-year time frame will find a lower rate of
recidivism than over a three-year time frame or nine-year time frame. 74
Because the Bail Reform Study allowed the pre-implementation defendants
more time to commit additional crimes than the post-implementation defendants, the
Study’s construction skewed the results towards finding a lower recidivism rate after
General Order 18.8A. It is not an apples-to-apples comparison to look at one group
of defendants who were released for, on average, 243 days and then to compare them
to another group of defendants who were released for, on average, 154 days. The
second group will, other things being equal, undoubtedly commit fewer additional
crimes simply because they have had less time to commit such crimes.
Given this disparity, it is appropriate to ask what would we expect to have been
the total number of “after” pretrial releasees committing crimes if the Bail Reform
Study had been extended until the average number of days for the “after” releasees
was the same as for the “before” releasees—i.e., if an average period of 243 days
had existed for both the before and after parts of the Study to measure releasees
committing crimes? This figure is straightforward to estimate. We can simply
divide 243 by 154 to come up with 1.57—i.e., the before period involved releasees
who were on the street for about 57% more time. According to the Study, after the
reform, during the days that they were released, a total of 4,164 defendants released
pretrial were charged with committing new crimes. 75 So if we take this number of

72

Id.
Id.
74
See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: 2018
UPDATE ON PRISONER RECIDIVISM: A 9-YEAR FOLLOW-UP PERIOD 4 (2018).
75
Subtracting total defendants from “crime-free” defendants, i.e., 17,591 crime-free males +
2,749 crime-free females = 20,340 total crime-free defendants, which can be subtracted from
73
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after defendants committing new crimes (4,164) and assume that if the releasees had
been measured for a 57% longer period, one conclusion might be that we would
expect a 57% increase in crimes over this period.
However, this approach of using a 57% increase assumes a constant (i.e.,
linear) rate of re-offending over time for the group of pretrial releasees in question.
Is this assumption accurate? We are unaware of any study providing a precise
timeline for month-to-month re-offending among pretrial releasees. However, a
comprehensive Bureau of Justice Statistics study on recidivism rates over time for
releasees from prison includes recidivism data in six-month increments. 76 That study
shows a slightly declining rate of recidivism. So using a straight-line, linear figure
of 57% may somewhat overstate the rate at which recidivism occurred among the
“after” pretrial releasees.
Using this Bureau of Justice Statistics study of recidivism by prisoners released
from prison, more than a third (36.8%) of all released prisoners who were arrested
within five years of release were arrested within the first six months, with more than
half (56.7%) arrested by the end of the first year. 77 It is possible to take these
numbers and fit a slightly declining polynomial value to the recidivism rate—and
then estimate what number of defendants would have been discovered committing
crimes. Applying this polynomial value to the Cook County data to correct for
slightly declining recidivism rates over time produces the result that we would
expect a 45% increase in the number of crimes in the “after” period had the releasees
been observed for the same length of time as the “before” period. 78
Interestingly, after we had made the calculation set out in the previous
paragraph, we were able to find data on recidivism among Cook County pretrial
releasees—data that corresponds (although is somewhat lower) than the estimate set
out above. The Cook County courts maintain a “dashboard” of statistics regarding
24,504 released defendants to produce the result that 4,164 defendants were not crime-free.
See BAIL REFORM STUDY, supra note 6, at 33 (Table 7B).
76
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF
PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010 (2014).
77
Id. at 7.
78
The linear recidivism detection rate is based on fitting a line at the two points (0,0) and
(6,36.8). The polynomial rate is based on fitting the three values of (0,0), (6, 36.8), and (12,
57.6). We use 240 days rather than 243 days for convenience, since that is a (roughly) eightmonth period of time. A linear extrapolation of the total number of crimes that would were
expected to have been committed by defendants released after the reform – had they been
studied for the same number of days as the defendants released before the reform – produces
a figure of 6,537 crimes (1.57 x 4,164). This figure then drops down slightly to 92.76%
(45.499/49.048) of the linear figure. Put another way, 1.57 x .927 = 1.455 – i.e., the
appropriate correction for the shorter observation period is to increase the number crimes
observed by about 45.5%. In turn 1.455 x 4,164 = 6,058.6 – the figure reported in text.
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the new pretrial release measures. 79 These statistics report whether pretrial releasees
have been charged with a new offense while released. These statistics show the
“community safety” rate—from which it is a simple matter to determine an inverse
“community safety failure” rate. For example, a “community safety” rate of 90%
means a “community safety failure” rate of 10%.
The Cook County dashboard tabulates information by quarter, 80 so it is possible
to review the failure rate in the “after” period on quarter-by-quarter. It is also
possible to estimate the recidivism rate on a quarter-by quarter-basis, as shown in
Table 1 below.
TABLE 1 - COOK COUNTY - COMMUNITY SAFETY FAILURE RATE
Year (in
quarterly
increments)

Public Safety
Failure Rate

Number of
Defendants
Released

Total
New
Crimes

1Q Dft’s
(and
failure
rate)

2Q Dft’s
(and
failure
rate)

3Q Dft’s
(and
failure
rate)

4Q Dft’s
(and
failure
rate)

Q4 2017

5.9%

4,378

258

4,378
(.0625)

Q1 2018

9.1%

9,199

837

4,281
(.0625)

4,378
(0.0575)

Q2 2018

11.4%

13,985

1,594

4,786
(.0625)

4,281
(0.0575)

4,378
(0.045)

Q3 2018

13.2%

19,711

2,602

5,726
(.0625)

4,786
(0.0575)

4,281
(0.045)

4,378
(0.040)

Q4 2018

15.3%

24,534

3,754

4,823
(.0625)

5,726
(0.575)

4,786
(0.045)

4,281
(0.040)

Source: Data from Circuit Court of Cook County, Model Bond Court Initiative, Data
Dashboards (various quarters from 2017 through 2018).
What this table shows is the community safety failure rate from October 1,
2017 (the beginning of the Study’s “after” period) through December 1, 2018—
roughly the end of the “after” period, although the releasees were followed for an
additional two months, through February 28, 2019. For example, in the fourth
quarter (Q4) of 2017, 4,378 defendants were released, and 5.9% recidivated (i.e.,
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/HOME/ModelBondCourtInitiative.aspx.
See id. (reporting data on “community safety rate,” as measured by felony defendants who
appeared in bond court and were released after October 1, 2017 and had not been charged
with a new offense while in the community”).
79
80
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5Q Dft’s
(and
failure
rate)

4,378
(0.020)

failed by being charged with new crimes) during that quarter—producing 258
additional crimes. In the next quarter—the first quarter of 2018, an additional 4,821
defendants were released, bringing the total of released defendants under the new
pretrial release initiative to 9,199 (as shown in the table). At this time, the total
number of new crimes committed by pretrial releasees was 837, which is the sum of
the new crimes committed by those who had been out on the streets for one quarter
and those who had been out on the streets for two quarters.
Examining the data for the five quarters from the fourth quarter of 2017 through
the fourth quarter of 2018, we were able to estimate a decaying recidivism function
that best explained the actual data above on a quarter-by-quarter basis. This function
was calibrated using Cook County pretrial release data with a focus on both the
marginal and total public safety failure rates. Our method minimized the
discrepancy between the actual and fitted number of total failures over the fivequarter span. We estimated that defendants out for one quarter had a recidivism rate
of 6.25% during that first quarter, 5.75% during the second quarter, 4.5% during the
third quarter, 4.0% during the fourth quarter, and 2.0% during the fifth quarter. The
total of number of new crimes is simply a function of the number of defendants who
have been released in each quarter multiplied by the estimated recidivism rate for
each quarter during which they were released. Our fitted model matches the
observed recidivism rate for the first five quarters of the new pretrial release
procedures—a total of new crimes of 3,754 were observed from pretrial releases
during those five quarters, and the same number would be estimated by our model.
We believe that this is a conservative estimate, as we have included all five quarters
in our model (i.e., fourth quarter 2017 through fourth quarter 2018) even though
reasons exist for believe that the new pretrial release procedures took some time to
phase-in and implement. 81
With our model in hand, we can more accurately derive a figure for the
undercount that resulting from the Bail Reform Study’s decision to observe
defendants only through February 28, 2019. Our model enables us to estimate how
many additional crimes would have been observed if the “after” defendants who
were released following G.O. 18.8A had been observed through the end of 2019.
Observing these “after” defendants through the end of the year would have been
about the same amount of time that the “before” defendants were observed, although
(here again) our approach is slightly conservative (i.e., produces a lower number of
a crimes in the “after” group than was likely actually the case).82 In other words, our

See Kiran Misra, Shifting Fronts in Bail Reform: Despite Reform Effort, the Pretrial
Detention System Still Causes Harm, Southside Weekly, Mar. 6, 2019, available at
https://southsideweekly.com/shifting-fronts-bail-reform/.
82
The “before” period in the study ended on September 30, 2017 and data collection in the
study ended on February 28, 2018. Thus, new crimes committed by the “before” defendants
were apparently collected for a seventeen-month period. Our approach allows an estimate
81
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approach has the effect of roughly equalizing the 243 day observation period for the
“before” defendants with a comparable observation period for the “after”
defendants. 83
Our model estimates that an addition 1,753 crimes were committed during
2019, and that 1,212 of these would have occurred after February 28, 2019. 84 In
other words, we estimate that the Bail Reform Study undercounted the number of
crimes committed by pretrial releasees in the “after” period by 1,212 crimes.
Using the additional crimes estimated above, we can then calculate a corrected
figure of “after” crimes moving from an observed 4,164 to an estimated 5,376. 85
Thus, the corrected figure suggested that the Study’s figures should be increased by
29% to correct for the undercount. 86 In other words, a reasonable (and conservative)
estimate is that, if the Study’s authors had not artificially truncated the time during
which they had studied the rates of re-arrest for pretrial releasees after G.O. 18.8A,
then that group of releasees would have been found to have committed 5,378 crimes.
With this figure in place, we can directly compare the 3,715 defendants who
were charged with committing new crimes in the “before” period to an estimated
5,376 defendants in the “after” period to tentatively conclude that G.O.18.8A
produced an additional 1,661 pretrial releasees who committed a crime after their
release 87—a 45% increase from the “before” period. 88 This is different than the
reported information in the Study, as shown in Figure 1 below.

of crimes committed by the “after” defendants for a shorter, twelve-month period, i.e., all of
2019.
83
The alert reader may wonder why, if the “before” observation period was 243 days, we
have chosen an after “observation” period of 365 days (i.e., all of 2019). The answer is that
while our model observes (i.e., predicts) crimes committed throughout all of 2019, it allows
for some percentage of defendant to be finally adjudicated during the year—just some
percentage of defendants were finally adjudicated during the “before” period. Again, our
approach is conservative (i.e., produces a lower number of crimes than were actually
committed by the “after” defendants) for the reasons explained in the previous footnote.
84
Our model produces 810 additional crimes in Q1 2019, 541 additional crimes in Q2 2019,
306 additional crimes in Q3 2019, and 96 additional crimes in Q4 2019. We then assume
that the Bail Reform Study captured 2/3rds of the crimes in Q1 2019 (i.e., January and
February 2019, but not March of 2019), and estimate that 269 crimes were committed in
March 2019 (1/3 x 810).
85
4,164 + 1,212 = 5,376. This is a more conservative estimate than the linear function or
the polynomial function discussed above would have produced.
86
5,376 ÷ 4,164 = 1.291.
87
5,376 estimated/projected releasees committing crimes in the “after” period - 3,715
releasees committing crimes in the “before” period.
88
5,376 ÷ 3,715 = 1.447.
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One question that immediately arises is whether that 45% difference can be
attributed to some difference between the “before” period and the “after” period.
Interestingly, the Study itself disclaims any such difference. The Study notes a slight
increase in filings between the “before” and “after” periods: Filings went up
modestly from the “before” period to the “after” by about 6.6%. 89 But other than
that change, the Study reported that basic age, gender, and race/ethnicity data
remained stable over both periods. 90 Also, the Study reported that cases factors and
PSA risk measures remained stable between both periods. 91
Nor does the change appear to be attributable to an external increase in crime
due to other factors apart from changes in pretrial release procedures. For example,
in 2018 (the bulk of the “after” period), crime declined in Chicago92 by 8% compared
to 2017, continuing a downward trend of declining by 10% since 2016. 93 Thus, if

30,432 felony hearing cases after compared to 28,547 cases before. BAIL REFORM STUDY,
supra note 6, at 8 (Table 1B).
90
Id. at 8.
91
Id. at 28.
92
Cook County is, of course, a larger area than Chicago. But Chicago’s population is a
majority of the Cook County population and, we understand, a majority of the crimes
committed in Cook County are committed in Chicago. As with the Bail Reform Study, given
the greater accessible of Chicago crime data, we use Chicago figures here, believing that
they will track trends in Cook County. Cf. BAIL REFORM STUDY, supra note 6, at 1 n.3 (using
Chicago crime data).
93
CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT, END-OF-YEAR CRIME STATISTICS: 2018, available at
89
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anything, we would expect that downward trends in overall crime rates would be
matched by a similar downward trend in crime by pretrial releasees. Instead, the
opposite appears to have occurred, as crimes by pretrial releasees appear to have
increased in the “after” period.
B. Violent Crimes Committed by Pretrial Releasees Appear to Have
Increased After Pretrial Release Was Expanded.
The numbers discussed so far have involved defendants who recidivated as
measured by being charged in Cook County with a new crime of any type. 94 Of
course, not all crimes are equally serious. Of particular interest is whether pretrial
releasees committed additional violent crimes.
The most widely publicized figure from the Bail Reform Study is that only
0.6% of pretrial releasees committed another violent crime after G.O. 18.8A,
compared to 0.7% before. Drilling down into this number, however, produces
significant cause for concern. To begin with, one of the features of G.O. 18.8A was
that it led to more defendants being released. Accordingly, even if the percentage
of defendants who committed violent crimes remained stable over the two periods,
we would expect an increase in the violent crimes simply because more defendants
were released.
And it turns out good reasons exist for concluding that pretrial releasees
committed more violent crimes after G.O. 18.8A than before. Although the Study
does not report this figure (or other raw numbers of violent crimes), a figure for
violent crimes can be straightforwardly derived. The number of violent crimes
committed by pretrial releasees in the fifteen months before G.O. 18.8A was about
143; the number in the fifteen months after was about 147. 95
But as just discussed above, the “before” and “after” periods during which
pretrial releasees were observed were not identical—the difference between the 243day observation period “before” versus the 154-day observation period “after.” As
also discussed above in connection with additional total crimes committed by
pretrial releasees, it is possible to correct for these different observation periods in
calculating additional violent crimes they committed. Adjusting for this difference,
instead of the 147 violent crimes committed after G.O. 18.8A, it is reasonable to

https://home.chicagopolice.org/cpd-end-of-year-crime-statistics-2018/ (visited at January
23, 2020). Chicago is a component part of Cook County and accounts for most its crime.
We do not immediately have available to us Cook County crime statistics for the relevant
periods, so we used Chicago statistics as indicative of general trends in the area.
94
See BAIL REFORM STUDY, supra note 6, at 30 n.16.
95
20,435 released before x 0.7% = 143.0; 24,504 x 0.6% = 147.0.
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estimate that pretrial releasees committed 190 violent crimes. 96 This means that,
based on our estimation, new violent crimes charged against pretrial releasees went
from 143 before G.O 18.8A to 190 after—an increase of 70 violent crimes or about
a 33% increase in the number of violent crimes after the new pretrial release
procedures, as shown in Figure 2 below. 97

The fact that the total number of violent crimes increased after G.O. 18.8A is
hardly surprising, given that more dangerous defendants are being released under
G.O. 18.8A. It does appear that the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) has at least
some modest predictive value of new criminal activity.98 And yet, G.O. 18.8A made
it much easier for defendants to be released even if their PSA score was concerning.
As one example, according to data in the Study, the number of defendants with a
“violence flag” who nonetheless secured their pretrial release increased from 747 in

147 x 1.2915 = 189.8. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (deriving the 1.2915
figure for adjusted reported additional crimes in the Study to estimated actual crimes in the
Study). As discussed in the next section, this number for total “violent” crimes is
substantially lower than the number of crimes actually involving violence committed by
pretrial releasees. In addition, because violent crime cases may take longer to work their
way through the system and be charged, our lagged recidivism model may slightly understate
recidivism for those charged with violent crimes. These two facts may render our calculation
here somewhat conservative (i.e., lower) than the actual number of violent crimes.
97
190 ÷ 143 = 1.328.
98
See BAIL REFORM STUDY, supra note 2, at 32 (presenting data showing a slightly declining
community safety rate with increases in New Criminal Activity Score).
96
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the “before” period to 1,038 in the “after” period—a 39% increase. 99 Put another
way, before G.O. 18.8A, 33.6% of those with a violence flag were released; after
G.O. 18.8A, 40.2% with a violence flag were released. If the PSA has any predictive
value, one would expect to find an increase in violence as a result of these release
decisions—which is what our estimated number reported above suggest.
G.O. 18.8A also lead to a significant increase in the release of defendants
charged with grave offenses, including defendants charged with violent crimes and
gun crimes. The percentage of released defendants charged with violent crimes
increased from 43.2% to 46.5%; the percentage of released defendants charged with
crimes against the person increased from 48.8% to 61.6%; and, perhaps most
concerning for an area flooded with gun violence, the percentage of released
defendants charged with weapons offenses increased from 60.6% to 76.4%. 100
Given the high cost of shooting crimes, a brief illustration of how the new
procedures operate in practice might be useful. A Chicago TV station (WGN-TV)
investigated every felony gun case committed during two of Chicago’s historically
most violent weekends in 2019: Memorial Day and Labor Day. The station found
that
•
•
•
•

A total of 118 adults were charged with felony weapons offenses.
87 percent were released on bond. The most anyone had to pay to get out
of jail before trial was $5,000.
72 percent were released the same they day they were arrested, or the very
next day.
30 percent walked out of jail without paying any money – they received IBonds (individual recognizance bonds). 101

This seems like a very high rate of release of defendants who might be assumed to
pose a danger to the community.
Other bail studies have suggested, unsurprisingly, that those who are denied
pretrial release are generally more dangerous than those who were released. For
example, John Goldkamp examined emergency releases of inmates and found that
the incremental releases involved more dangerous inmates.102 And it appears to be
the case that a defendant facing a charge of a violent crime is, if rearrested, more

See id. at 35 (Figure 14).
See id. at 25 (Table 4A).
101
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John S. Goldkamp, Questioning the Practice of Pretrial Detention: Some Empirical
Evidence from Philadelphia, 74 J. CRIM. L. & Criminology 1556, 1586 (1983). See
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likely to be arrested for a crime of violence. 103 To be sure, these rates of rearrest are
likely to be “low”—i.e., a small percentage. But even a “low” rearrest rate means an
increased number of crimes. It should come as no surprise, then, that as Cook County
decided to release more pretrial detainees charged with violent and potentially
violent crimes, the result was that additional violent crimes were committed.
C. The Data from Bail Reform Study Appears to Have Significantly
Undercounted Violent Crimes Committed by Pretrial Releasees.
Obviously, it would be useful to know more about the kinds of violent crimes
that increased after G.O. 18.8A. The Study’s definition of “violent” crimes was
confined to “murder, attempted murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape,
robbery, and aggravated battery.” 104 As result, serious charges involving weapons
(including unlawful possession or use of a firearm) were excluded. 105 But even using
the Study’s own definition of violent crimes, the Study fails to report data on
precisely what kinds of violent crimes pretrial releasees committed. 106
Even more concerning, however, a very recent investigative report by the
Chicago Tribune casts doubt on the whether Bail Reform Study fully captured all of
the violent crimes caused by Cook County new and more generous pretrial release
procedures. While the Study does not provide a crime-by-crime breakdown of what
crimes were committed by pretrial releasees, it does contain several explanatory
sentences about the violent crime of greatest interest: murder. The Study reports
that, during the post-implementation period, nine defendants were charged with
murder. 107 The Study goes on to report that, of those nine, six had committed their
murders before their original bail hearing dates. 108 Apparently these six cases
involved situations were someone had committed a murder, was later arrested on a
different crime, released on bond, and then was subsequently charged with the
murder. Of course, murders can take considerable time to investigate, and this lag
time between the commission of a murder and the subsequent filing of criminal
charges could mean that the murderer (while under investigation) would have
subsequent interactions with the criminal justice system. It would not be fair, of
See Baradaran & McIntrye, supra note 61, at 528-29 (finding that “defendants charged
initially with violent crimes were much more likely to be rearrested for violent crimes”).
104
BAIL REFORM STUDY, supra note 6, at 5. This is the same definition employed by the
FBI’s Uniform Crime Report for violent crimes.
105
See BAIL REFORM STUDY, supra note 6, at 5.
106
The Study does have an appendix, available online, reporting data for the community
safety rate for pretrial defendants broken down into various categories. See id. at 39
(discussing Appendix, Table 4). But that appendix does not contain data on the kinds of
crimes that pretrial releases committed, as it reports only data for “no new criminal activity”
and “new criminal activity.” See id.
107
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course, to attribute a murder such as this to someone being released on bond—the
murder had occurred before the release decision. This clarification removed six of
the nine murders committed in the post-implementation period and seemingly left
only three murders committed by pretrial releases during the “after” study period in
the Study. This was what the Study’s authors reported. 109
Three reporters at the Chicago Tribune (David Jackson, Todd Lighty, and Gary
Marx) investigated this assertion in greater depth. 110 Digging more deeply into
Chicago’s homicide numbers, the reporters used Chicago police data to identify all
adults charged with a Chicago homicide since the G.O. 18.8A, then accessed
criminal court data to determine whether these adults were out on bail at the time. 111
Those records showed 21 defendants were charged with killing people while they
were out on pretrial bond for other pending charges during the fifteen month period
after G.O. 18.8A (i.e., during October 1, 2017 through December 31, 2018). Sixteen
of those 21 accused murdered were out on bail awaiting trial for felony charges
including attempted murder. 112 The other five defendants had been bonded out on
misdemeanor crimes. 113 Yet four of the five had felony backgrounds and three of
them had done prison stints: One had violated his current bond, one was charged
with street gang contacts as a parolee.
The reporters were also able to explain the dramatic disparity between the three
homicides disclosed in the Study and the 21 identified by the Tribune’s
investigation. The reasons for the dramatic undercount varied from case to case,
but included:
•

•

The Study included only those defendants whose initial charge was a felony;
it excluded those charged with a misdemeanor, which is far more common.
Five of the murder defendants found by the Tribune had bonded out of jail
on misdemeanor charges. Four of them had past felony convictions from
attempted murder to armed robbery, and three had served prison time.
The Study counted only the first new charge against defendants after they
were released from custody. The Tribune identified two people who were
released, charged with another crime, released again and then charged with
murder, all within the time period being examined. Those later murder
charges were not entered into the database used for the report.

Id. at 36-37.
David Jackson, Todd Lighty, & Gary Marx, Bail Reform Analysis by Cook County Chief
Judge Based on Flawed Data, Undercounts New Murder Charges, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 13, 2020,
available at https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/ct-cook-county-bail-bondreform-tim-evans-20200213-tkodxevlyvcp7k66q2v2ahboi4-story.html.
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•
•

The Study excluded three murder defendants whose first charge occurred
before bail reform even though they were released on bond after the reforms
took effect in September 2017.
Data entry mistakes and incomplete court records marred the data set used
in the analysis. 114

Of course, these 21 cases involve only a tiny fraction of the Study’s data set.
But there is every reason for thinking that such problems permeate the rest of the
Study’s dataset. Indeed, more broadly than the specific problems identified in these
21 cases, it appears that the Study used a narrowly defined definition for pretrial
“releasees” as including only defendants released at their initial bond hearing 115—
not those who were released in subsequent court hearings, as likely happens
frequently in Cook County criminal courts. This maneuver no doubt had the effect
of moving a number of crimes committed by defendants who had, in fact, been
released pretrial from the Study’s category for “defendants released pretrial” 116 and
into a category for defendants who had not secured release. 117
Using this narrow classification is indefensible from the perspective of
obtaining reliable information for making public policy decisions. Clearly G.O.
18.8A applies, not just release decisions made at the initial bond hearing, but to all
release decisions. 118 Indeed, because violent crimes cases are typically more
complicated than other crimes, it would not be surprising to find that release
decisions in such cases took multiple hearings—in contrast to simpler cases where
release determinations could be made more rapidly. The Bail Reform Study’s
restriction of examining only “releasees” at the initial hearing likely concealed a
significant number of violent crimes that were committed by persons who, in fact,
were able to obtain release.
The Tribune also analyzed the Study’s use of a narrow definition of “violent
crime,” counting only the crimes of murder (or attempted murder or non-negligent
manslaughter), rape, robbery, and aggravated battery. 119 While this definition
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largely tracks the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports, 120 it excludes many crimes that
would commonly be viewed as violent, including domestic battery, battery, assault,
assault with a deadly weapon, and armed violence. For purposes of this article, we
will refer to this broader definition as “crimes against persons.” If crimes such these
were included in the count of crimes committed by pretrial releasees, then the total
number of “crimes against persons” would have been at least four times greater than
the number of “violent” crimes. 121
Using the Tribune’s more fulsome definition of crimes against persons, we can
estimate how many additional such crimes were committed as the result of Cook
County’s expanded release procedures. Taking our figure of 70 additional violent
crimes based on the Bail Reform Study’s definition and simply multiplying by 400%
produces the reasonable estimate that at least 280 additional crimes against persons
were committed by the defendants released after G.O. 18.8A than before. 122
D. Prosecutors Dropped Aggravated Domestic Violence Cases More
Frequently After the Bail Changes.
Another serious defect in the Bail Reform Study’s data deserves a brief
mention. In May 2019 (about the same time as the Bail Reform Study was released),
two reporters at the Chicago Tribune (David Jackson and Madeline Buckley)
compared Cook County domestic violence cases in 2016 (before G.O. 18.8A) with
those in 2018 (after G.O. 18.8A was in effect). 123 Focusing on the most serious cases
(aggravated domestic batteries), the reporters found that it was easier for defendants
accused of aggravated domestic batteries to obtain pretrial release after bail reform.
In 2016, the average bond per defendant accused of such attacks was $63,859; in
2018, the average bond was $13,505. 124 In addition, the percentage of defendants

The Uniform Crime Reports counts all “aggravated assaults,” a category that might be
slightly different than the Study’s “aggravated battery” category.
121
Jackson, Lighty & Marx, supra note 110.
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who were released on their own recognizance 125 essentially doubled, from 10% of
all defendants to 19% of all defendants. 126
Given the dynamics of domestic violence cases, it would seem logical that if
more domestic defendants were released pretrial, then they would be able to place
increased pressure on their victims not to continue to support prosecution – leading
to an increase in the number of domestic violence prosecutions that would be
dropped. It is widely recognized that domestic “[b]atterers put hydraulic pressures
on domestic violence victims to recant, drop the case, or fail to appear at trial.” 127
Consistent with what that logic would predict, the Tribune reporters discovered that
the percentage of aggravated domestic battery cases that prosecutors dropped
increased from 56% of all cases in 2016 (before G.O. 18.8A) to 70% of all cases in
2018 (when G.O. 18.8A was in effect).
The Tribune also provided a reason why the new approach to pretrial release
might have particularly harmed the prosecution of serious cases. As the bail reform
efforts developed in Cook County, they relied on the Arnold Foundation’s Public
Safety Assessment (PSA). 128 But while that assessment sets out restrictive
guidelines for releasing persons charged with certain violent offenses (murder,
sexual assault, and robbery), it fails to provide similar restrictions for domestic
violence crimes. 129 Moreover, the Arnold PSA does not take into account current or
prior protective orders; nor does it consider a defendant’s violation of those orders
as a risk factor. 130 While the Arnold Foundation is planning a research initiative to
explore whether domestic violence cases should receive different treatment in the
future, 131 as the PSA operated during the Bail Reform Study, it appears to have
significantly underprotected victims of aggravated domestic violence, leading to a
significant increase in cases that could not be prosecuted, presumably due to witness
intimidation by domestic abusers. 132 This fact prompted the Chicago Tribune’s
125
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editorial board to wonder “how promises to be more deft in lower-stakes cases of
retail theft or minor drug offenses morphed into a lighter touch with those who
allegedly beat or choke their intimate partners or family members.” 133
V. THE BAIL REFORM STUDY'S COST-BENEFIT ASSESSMENT.
So far, we have focused on the public safety implications of the General Order
18.8A. In this section, we try to take a step back and briefly ask the broader question
of whether, weighing all the costs and benefits, General Order 18.8A was costbeneficial. The Bail Reform Study asserted that the changes were cost-beneficial,
given various financial savings and other benefits that followed from reducing the
population of Cook County pretrial detainees. Our conclusion is a cautionary one:
We think it is premature to reach broad conclusions about whether the General Order
has been a positive or negative change for the Cook County criminal justice system.
Instead, a more careful review of issues is necessary before any firm conclusions
can be reached. This section discusses some of the data that would be needed to
reach firmer conclusions as well as some of the overlooked challenges to
determining that bail reforms are truly cost-beneficial.
A. The Need for Reanalysis of the Data Regarding Crimes by Pretrial Releasees.
In publishing the Bail Reform Study, the Office of the Chief Judge of the Cook
County Circuit Court boldly pronounced that the Chief Judge’s order had been a
success. According to the Study’s opening paragraph, General Order 18.8A had not
only “promoted justice” through greater release of defendants before trial, but also
“protected public safety” through greater use of no bond orders, producing a net
result of no increase in crime. 134 These are strong claims—and empirical claims that
ultimately rest on the reliability of the Study’s data.
Against that backdrop, it is surprising to learn that the Office has previously
been reluctant to share the Study’s data with other researchers. In 2019, the Chicago
Tribune made a concerted effort to obtain the data underlying the Bail Reform

defendants committed a new crime while they were free on pretrial bonds. But this analysis
did not include defendants charged with bond violations—only those defendants who
formally had new charges filed against them. And even more concerning, Judge Evans did
not allow the Tribune to examine the case records underlying his analysis, saying that he
wanted to protect the privacy of defendants who had not been found guilty of a crime.
133
Editorial Board, Cook County Jail Reforms Shouldn’t Put Domestic Violence Victims at
TRIB.,
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Study. 135 It requested electronic docketing data for felony criminal defendants in
39,051 cases that occurred from September 18, 2017, through March 31, 2019, thus
covering the cases involved in the Bail Reform Study. 136 But the Chief Judge
withheld basic case information for 76% of the cases because the defendants had not
yet been convicted. 137 The effect of this decision was to prevent the Chicago Tribune
from investigating the claims made in the Bail Reform Study. 138
On December 23, 2019, the Chicago Tribune sought a writ of mandamus from
the Illinois Supreme Court, asking it to direct the Cook County courts to produce
the records regarding the cases in the study. 139 The Tribune’s legal claims were wellfounded. The First Amendment guarantees the public a right of access to basic
criminal court records, such as court records regarding charges filed, pretrial release
decisions, convictions, and other similar information. 140 Rather than contest the
matter further, the Office of the Chief Judge has recently agreed to produce at least
some of the records 141—but because of its delay in the production of the data,
analysis of the issue as corresponding been delayed.
The delay in producing the data is disturbing to us because, in our experience
as academics, the exchange of data underlying an empirical research study is
standard practice. Moreover, if the Chief Judge releases a report claiming that a new
policy is a success, he should at least be open to the possibility that his conclusions
can be challenged. In any event, now that the underlying data will apparently be
released, it will be interesting to see what that data reveals. 142
But even without looking at the details of the data, based on the information
collected in this article, we believe that it is important that the Bail Reform Study be
revised and updated (ideally by the Study’s authors themselves). Indeed, we join
with the Chicago Tribune, whose Editorial Board recently wrote: “Certainly this is
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clear: [The Chief Judge’s Report] evalting his own program is deficient and
therefore of limited value. Withdraw and redo it, Your Honor.” 143
Beyond those general sentiments, we believe that it would be appropriate for
the Study’s authors to undertake a reanalysis in the following specific areas:
1.

Rather than using different fifteen-month periods that do not
include the same number of warm weather (i.e., high crime)
months, the Bail Reform Study data should be reported based on
identical one-year “before” and “after” periods. Specifically, the
“before” period should be October 1, 2016, through September 30,
2017; the “after” period should be October 1, 2017, through
September 30, 2018. This would eliminate the problem with the
current report that the “before” period contains five warm weather
months while the after period contains only three warm weath
months. 144

2. The data in the Bail Reform Study on “crime-free” defendants
should be reanalyzed, so that any new charges filed up through
February 1, 2020 are included. As discussed above, the “after”
period in the current study ran from October 1, 2017, through
December 1, 2018—but then analysis of whether pretrial releasees
had committed any crimes terminated just two months later—at
the end of February 2019. The net result of this approach was that
the defendants released in the “after” period were studied for a
much shorter period than were the defendants released in the
“before” period—skewing the findings towards concluding that
fewer crimes had been committed after General Order 18.8A.
Whatever the merits of that approach might have been last year,
now that an additional year has passed, it should be easy to extend
the study observation period for that additional year. This would
eliminate the skewing effect by producing greater similarity
between the length of time that data on new crimes charged against
pretrial releasees were collected in both the “before” and “after”
periods . 145
3. The Bail Reform Study should expand its definition of a “pretrial
releasee” to include anyone who is released pretrial. In its current
iteration, the Study apparentlyl only considers someone to have
See Editorial Board, A Report’s Flaws Suggest: Cook County Bail Reforms May Have
Endangered the Public, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 13, 2020
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been released pretrial if that release occurred at the initial bond
hearing. But that approach makes little sense from a public policy
perspective, as many defendants—particularly those in complex
cases, such as homicide cases—are released in a second or
subsequent hearing. So that researchers and policymakers can rely
on the Bail Reform Study’s information about pretrial “releasees,”
the Study should report comprehensive information about all those
who were, in fact, released under the new release procedures. 146
4. The Bail Reform Study should provide more detailed information
about the specific types of crimes committed by pretrial releasees
in both the “before” and “after” periods, particularly the kind of
violent crimes and shooting offenses that were committed.
Because the Study is vague about the nature of the recidivism of
pretrial releasees, it is difficult to engage in detailed cost-benefit
analysis about General Order 18.8A. The costs of the General
Order are likely to be concentrated in the most violent crimes,
particularly homicides and shooting offenses.
Detailed
information about those crimes is needed. 147
We sent an advance copy of our study to the Office of the Chief Judge requesting
comments on these points and, more broadly, on our study, but had not received any
response by the time this article was released. We continue to hope that the Office
of the Chief Judge will consider the points advanced here and provide detailed
answers regarding these important issues.
B. Some Tentative Thoughts on a Complete Cost-Benefit Assessment.
For the reasons just explained, it is impossible at this time to precisely tabulate
all of G.O. 18.8A’s costs—i.e., the increase in the number of crimes caused by the
new, more generous pretrial release procedures. We hope that it is will be possible
to have better information soon, which would then be the first step in a more rigorous
cost-benefit analysis than that offered by the Bail Reform Study. But, at this
preliminary stage, we offer some tentative thoughts on how a complete cost-benefit
analysis might ultimately be made as more data becomes available.
1. The Costs of Expanded Pretrial Release.
We turn first to the costs of G.O. 18.8A. In determining how to calculate costs,
we are aided by Professor Shima Baradaran Baughman’s pathbreaking recent article,
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“Costs of Pretrial Detention.” 148 There, Professor Baughman sketches out how a
comprehensive cost-benefit assessment might be made of a change of pretrial release
procedures. In assessing the potential costs of expanded pretrial release, Baughman
identifies four kinds of costs: (1) additional prosecuted crimes during the pretrial
release period; (2) additional crimes not detected during the pretrial release period;
(3) additional failures to appear in court; and (4) additional costs of monitoring
released defendants. Focusing on the first two costs, 149 it is important to have some
measure of the number of crimes committed by pretrial releasees that are not
detected by law enforcement. For example, we have estimated above that an
additional 1,212 defendants were charged with new crimes while released, including
70 new violent crime charges as well as a total 280 new charges for crimes against
persons. 150 These measures of recidivism rely on police detecting and solving the

Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 97 BOST. U.L. REV. 1 (2017).
The other costs are not trivial. For example, Cook County appears to be spending millions
of dollars more on probation officers to monitor the increased number of pretrial releasees.
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The Dobbie study also contains an on-line appendix reporting the results of a costbenefit analysis of the results of a marginal release of an individual pretrial. They find a net
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new crime and then prosecutors filing new charges. Of course, not every crime
committed by a pretrial releasee is solved by police and then prosecuted by
prosecutors. So for an accurate cost-benefit calculation, some substantail adjustment
is necessary. Given that police solve or “clear” violent crimes only about 45% the
time and property crimes only about 20% of the time, any cost calculation based on
charged crimes will likely require multiplication by 200% or more to reflect the
number of crimes released defendants actually committed. 151 One of the defects in
the Bail Reform Study is that it fails to acknowledge that its data on additional
charges filed against pretrial releasees does not capture all of the crimes that those
releasees likely committed. 152
One conservative calcuation will illustrate this point. We have previously
estimated that the expanded pretrial releases from G.O. 18.8A led to at least 280
additional charged new crimes against persons in the fifteen months after the Order
compared to the fifteen months before. Using crime clearance rates to estimate what
fraction these charged crimes were compared to the crimes actually committed by
the pretrial releasees, we can estimate that G.O. 18.8A led to 930 additional crimes
against persons in the “after” period compared to the “before” before.153

increase in homicides by pretrial releasees in Cook County. See supra notes 110-14 and
accompanying text.
151
See, e.g., Cassell & Fowles, Still Handcuffing the Cops, supra note 13, at 709 (figure 2 –
violent crime clearance rates nationally around 45%), 710 (figure 3 – property crime
clearance rates nationally around 20%). Clearance rates in Cook County (particularly in
Chicago) may be lower than national averages. See Jeremy Gorner, With Its Low Solve Rate
for Shootings, Chicago Police to Add 50 Sergeants to Oversee Detectives, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
4, 2018, available at
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-chicago-police-detectives20181203-story.html; but cf. Frank Main, Chicago’s Murder-Clearance Rate Rose Sharply
in 2019, Police Say, Chi. Sun-Times, Dec. 31, 2019 (Chicago’s murder clearance rate rose
from
29%
in
2016
to
53%
in
2019),
available
at
https://chicago.suntimes.com/politics/2019/12/31/21044720/murder-clearance-ratechicago-police-department.
152
See, e.g., BAIL REFORM STUDY, supra note 6, at 36 (apparently asserting that the study’s
data capture all crimes committed by pretrial releasees).
153
To derive this number, we first took Chicago’s “violent” crime clearance rate for 2018,
which is 30.1%. See Chicago Police Dep’t, 2018 Annual Report at 62 (reporting clearance
rates for homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery), available at
http://home.chicagopolice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/2018AnnualReport05July19.pdf. We then applied that 30.1% figure to our estimated 280 charged new crimes
against persons to produce our estimated actual number of crimes against persons. This is a
conservative calculation (i.e., produces a lower figure) because the clearance rate for
“violent” crimes is higher than for other crimes, which receive less attention from law
enforcement. Here again, we use Chicago figures rather than Cook County figures, because
of their ready availability. See supra note 92.
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Even with some estimate of the actual number of crimes committed by pretrial
releasees in hand, the salient issue becomes what cost to assign to each additional
crime committed. Other research has explored this subject of the cost of crime. 154
In her article on pretrial detention, Professor Baughman has helpfully collected some
of the available information in a table, containing an estimate for the range of the
costs for each type of crime that might be avoided through pretrial detention.
The striking conclusion from that table is that any cost-benefit calculation will
likely hinge on the number of additional murders produced by increasing pretrial
releases, perhaps in combination with a few other very serious crimes (such as rapes
and shootings). Professor Baughman reports that, in a cost-benefit calculation
regarding pretrial release programs, the benefits of avoiding a murder range
(according to previous research) from $4,602,326 to $18,780,120 (in 2014
dollars). 155 The high figure includes not only tangible but also intangible costs, 156 an
issue that one could debate in deciding how best to conduct a cost-benefit
calculation. But for present purposes, it is enough to note that even if G.O. 18.8A
produced just a few additional homicides, there would be a serious argument that
the costs of the measure were substantial, in the tens of millions of dollars. Of
course, given the Chicago Tribune’s discovery that rather than just three murders
being committed by pretrial releasee after the Order a total of 21 were committed, 157
this possibility is no mere speculative possibility.
This issue of additional crimes committed by additional pretrial releasees is
critical to any full cost-benefit analysis, as bail reformers have been optimistic that
more accurate tools for making pretrial release decisions would allow additional
defendants to be released without any increase in crime.158 But, properly understood,
the data from Cook County raises questions about whether this will be possible.

See, e.g., Cassell & Fowles, supra note 14, at 1648 (reporting research on the cost of gun
crimes).
155
Id. at 11 (citing Matt DeLisi et al., Murder by Numbers: Monetary Costs Imposed by a
Sample of Homicide Offenders, 21 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 501, 506 tbl.1
(2010); Ted R. Miller, Mark A. Cohen & Brian Wiersema, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, NCJ
155282, Victim Costs and Consequences: A New Look 9-18VICTIM COSTS AND
CONSEQUENCES:
A
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tbl.
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(1996),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/Abstract.aspx?id=155282
[https://perma.cc/468DHALR]). One of us (Fowles) has used a different methodology,
limited to tangible costs, to produce figures (for Utah) that are lower. See Fowles & Nyström,
supra note 12, at 6. Exploring differences in these calculations is beyond the scope of this
article.
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Cook County released pretrial about 4,000 more defendants in the fifteen
months after G.O. 18.8A went into effect than in the fifteen months before. 159 Given
that more defendants were released in the “after” period, the question naturally arises
as to whether the G.O. produced more defendants charged with new crimes because
more defendants were being released or because more dangerous defendants were
released. The data suggest that the answer is both.
As reported by the Bail Reform Study, pretrial releasees in the “after” period
went up numerically by about 20%. 160 Accordingly, one might expect the number
of crimes to have increased by about 20%. But the total (estimated) crimes
committed in the “after” period vs. the “before” period went up by substantially
more than 20%—indeed, by roughly 45%. 161 So it appears that somewhat more than
half of the additional estimated crimes appear have resulted from the release of a
more dangerous (i.e., more crime-prone) population of defendants.
Another approach that also suggests this conclusion is that in the fifteen
months before G.O.18.8A, 20,435 defendants 162 were released for an average of 243
days. 163 Multiplying those numbers together produces 4,965,705 days when
defendants were released pretrial before the new G.O. During those days that they
were released, 3,715 defendants were charged with committing new crimes. 164 This
means that during the “before” period, it took 1,337 days of defendants being
released for the public to suffer a new charged crime 165 from a pretrial releasee. 166
In the fifteen months after G.O.18.8A, 24,504 defendants 167 were released for
an average of 154 days. 168 Multiplying those numbers together produces 3,773,616
days when defendants were released pretrial after the G.O. During those days that

See BAIL REFORM STUDY, supra note 6, at 31 (table 6A) (20,435 released before, 24,504
released after). As discussed above, these figures apparently include only those defendants
released at initial bail hearings. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
160
24,504/20,435 = 1.20.
161
6,059 ÷ 3,715 = 1.63.
162
17,431 males + 3,004 females = 20,435 total defendants.
163
BAIL REFORM STUDY, supra note 2, at 30.
164
Subtracting total defendants from “crime free” defendants, i.e., 14,146 crime-free males
+ 2,574 crime-free females = 16,720 total crime-free defendants, which can be subtracted
from 20,435 released defendants to produce the result that 3,715 defendants were not crime
free.
165
For simplicity in calculation, we assume that a defendant who was not “crime-free”
committed one crime. It is likely that the pool of such defendants committed, one average,
more than one crime.
166
4,965,705 days ÷ 3,715 crimes = 1,337 days for each crime.
167
21,326 males + 3,178 females = 24,504 total defendants.
168
BAIL REFORM STUDY, supra note 2, at 30.
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they were released, the 4,164 defendants were charged with committing new
crimes. 169 This means during the “after” period, it took 906 days of defendants being
released for the public to suffer a new charged crime from a pretrial releasee. 170
In other words, after the reform, it appears that the population of defendants
being released committed crimes against the public more rapidly than the population
before—committing a new crime (on average) in 906 days rather than the earlier
1,337 days—presumably because more dangerous/crime-prone defendants were
being released. This means it can be estimated that releasees after G.O. 18.8A were,
roughly speaking (and subject to the caveats above), about 50% more likely to
commit crimes on an apples-to-apples (i.e., crimes per day) basis than were releasees
before G.O. 18.8A. 171 The fact that the additional pretrial releasees appear to have
been substantially more likely to commit additional crimes is important because bail
reform (like other public policy reforms) presumably reaches a point of diminishing
returns.
To be sure, G.O. 18.8A’s defenders could properly point out that our “cost”
numbers regarding additional crimes consistute a relatively small percentage of the
overall number of crimes in Cook County. We agree that it would be unreasonable
to attempt to blame Cook County’s expanded pretrial release measures as somehow
singlehandedly explaining Cook County’s overall high crime rates. Many other
factors would need to be considered. But our focus in this article is whether
expanded pretrial release procedures can pay their way forward under a cost-benefit
analysis. In this sense, any costs from expanded pretrial release measures are a selfinflicted wound 172—costs in additional crimes that policymakers could have simply
avoided by never “reforming” release procedures at all.
Defenders of G.O. 18.8A are also likely to argue that, even under a more
fulsome cost-benefit analysis of the type we are describing here, the measure could
still ultimately prove to be cost-beneficial. These arguments are not without basis,
as we discuss in the next section below. But the key point of our article is not that
G.O. 18.8A could never be justified as cost-beneficial; rather, our more limited point
is that it has yet to be so justified. The Bail Reform Study appears to rest on an

Subtracting total defendants from “crime-free” defendants, i.e., 17,591 crime-free males
+ 2,749 crime-free females = 20,340 total crime-free defendants, which can be subtracted
from 24,504 released defendants to produce the result that 4,164 defendants were not crimefree. Of course, as discussed at length above, this figure likely undercounts the number of
defendants in the “after” period who were not crime-free.
170
3,773,616 days ÷ 4,164 crimes = 906 days for each crime.
171
1,337 ÷ 906 = 1.475.
172
Cf. FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970) (discussing unnecessary
costs stemming from release of convicted criminals due to Miranda’s retroactive
application).
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illusion that G.O. 18.8A is entirely without costs 173—i.e., that it did not in any way
increase crimes committed against the public. Our conclusion is that the situation is
more complicated. In particular, we question the counterintuitive assertion that
many more arrested defendants could be released before trial without causing the
public to suffer at least some additional crimes. Instead, the analysis here suggests
that at least some additional crimes—and, thus, additional costs—have to be
tabulated as part of a thorough cost-benefit analysis.

2. The Benefits of Expanded Pretrial Release.
While G.O. 18.8A’s costs need to be accurately measured, the Order
undeniably provided considerable benefits to the public and to the released
defendants that need to be measured as well. Here again, Profesor Baughman’s
article provides a helpful starting point for analysis. As she explained, expanding
pretrial release can be expected to produce multiple benefits, including benefits to
detainees of avoiding loss of liberty, standing in the community, and disruption to
family life and other relationships and of mitigating direct economic costs (lost
income and lost job opportunities). 174 Expanded pretrial release can also produce
benefits to society, notably reduction in the direct costs associated with incarcerating
defendants (i.e., the costs of building and operating jails) and the indirect costs, such
as depriving children of the financial and emotional support that their detained
parents would otherwise be able to provide as well as difficult-to-quantify costs
related to impacts on the presumption of innocence. 175
Estimating the value of such benefits is difficult—but not impossible.
Professor Baughman, for example, has made an initial stab at what such figures
might look like for national levels of pretrial release decisions. 176 In this article, we
are not in a position to calculate the value of all these benefits for the changes
implemented in Cook County through G.O. 18.8A. But we tentatively suggest that,
using Baughaman’s approach, it may be the case that G.O. 18.8A is not costbeneficial.
As noted above, 177 as a jurisdiction increases the number of defendants who
are released pretrial, the pool of pretrial releases will often become progressively
173
Cf. Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda’s Defenders,
90 NW. U.L. REV. 1084 (1996) (arguing that Miranda reforms have not been subjected to
serious cost-benefit analysis).
174
See Baughman, supra note 148, at 5-6, 16-17.
175
See id. at 6-7, 16-17
176
See id. at 16-17.
177
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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more dangerous. Professor Baughman has quantified this important point with her
cost-benefit calculations about pretrial release decisions, based on data from
multiple jurisdictions across the country. Her data suggest that initially a societal net
benefit exists to increasing the percentage of defendants who are released pretrial—
but at some point, releasing more defendants becomes too dangerous and further
releases are not net beneficial. 178 Using her data, Professor Baughman derives a
figure for the optimal level of pretrial releases. She estimates that releasing
defendants until the point at which about 31% of all defendants are detained
produces a net societal benefit—compared to the 38% rate at which judges around
the country currently detain defendants. 179
Professor Baughman’s estimate has important public policy implications for
bail reform efforts in this country. If her estimate is correct, pretrial releases could
be expanded around the country and produce a net societal benefit in the average
jurisdiction. But Baughman’s calculation of an optimal national release rate
becomes quite interesting when compared to Cook County’s rate. Before G.O.
18.8A, Cook County detained only 28.4% of felony defendants—already a higher
percentage of releases than Baughman estimates would be optimal. And after the
new procedures were implemented, Cook County’s detention rate fell even further,
to only 19.5% 180—a significantly lower percentage of defendants detained than the
percentage that Professor Baughman estimates would be optimal. This suggests that
Cook County may have taken its reform measures to such an extreme that, however
well-intentioned, they went too far.
In addition, one cautionary note is needed about the kind of cost-benefit
calculations that Baughman’s article so nicely summarizes. Baughman’s costbenefit calculations implicitly equate (for example) a one dollar value of a
defendant’s liberty with a one dollar value of the cost of a crime. While from a pure
dollars-and-cents point of view, this assumption can be defended, relying on the
assumption for public policy purposes creates what economists characterize as
“distributional” issues.181 The benefits of expanded pretrial release are most directly
conferred, of course, on the defendants who have been arrested. On the other hand,
the costs of the crimes those releasees commit fall on victims who, by and large,
have done nothing to warrant suffering those crimes committed. Without
considering the relative entitlement to benefits of the two groups—presumptive
criminals and their victims—it is difficult to argue that a simple cost-benefit analysis
accurately captures the relative tradeoffs.
See Baughman, supra note 148, at 19-23.
See id. at 21-22.
180
See BAIL REFORM STUDY, supra note 6, at 24.
181
For an illustration of how distributional issues can affect cost-benefit analysis, see, e.g.,
Miqdad Asaria et al., Distributional Cost Cost-Effectiveness Analysis—A Tutorial, 36
MEDICAL DECISIONMAKING 8 (2016) (explaining how health inequality concerns can affect
cost-benefit analysis when implementing medical reforms).
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It is possible to illustrate this point with a hypothetical example. Let’s assume
that new expanded pretrial release procedures could be implemented in our
hypothetical jurisdiction—giving defendants greater liberty but at the cost of
additional crimes. Let’s also assume that the new procedures produce one additional
murder, ten additional rapes, one hundred additional assaults, and one hundred
additional robberies. The total cost of these new procedures, using (conservative)
figures from Professor Baughman’s table on the costs of crime, is about $7.5 million,
mostly stemming from the additional murder.182 On the other hand, let’s also assume
that the new procedures confer certain benefits on the released defendants, such as
greater freedom, greater income, and lower strain on intimate relationships. 183 Let’s
further assume that our hypothetical jurisdiction’s expanded pretrial release
procedures will release 500 defendants for an additional 100 days each. The total
benefit conferred on defendants of the new procedures, using Professor Baughman’s
figures is about $9,000,000 184—a million dollars more than the cost. And yet we are
uncertain whether many policy makers would be convinced to adopt the new
measure based on the greater benefits conferred on the pool of defendants. After all,
the one thing that we do know for certain about every pretrial detainee is that, even
though he is presumed to be innocent, he has done something that led a judge to find
probable cause for believing the defendant committed a serious crime justifying
detention. 185 Giving equal weigh to the benefits the pool of such defendants receive
when compared to the costs inflicted on crime victims seems dubious.
To be sure, this hypothetical example would require additonal examination
before determining whether it was cost-beneficial. Most obviously, the general
public also incurs costs if defendants are detained—e.g., the significant costs of
jailing detainees. But here again, distributional issues arise. The costs of crime
appear to fall most heavily on impoverished communities; 186 benefits of tax savings
will, of course, extend disproportionately to upper-income taxpayers who pay the
most taxes. In addition, some of the distributional issues will involve other innocent
persons. Pretrial detention of parents, for example, imposes costs on children who
lose financial and emotional support 187 (not to mention the costs to taxpayers who
may have to provide financial assistance to such children). The basic point remains
that without some assessment of the relative entitlement of the recipients of the cost
and benefits of bail reform, the cost-benefit analysis is incomplete.
See id. at 11 (table 2) (providing “low” estimate of the cost of murder at $4,602,326; of
rape at $136,191; of assault at $14,715; and of robbery at $12,523).
183
See Baughman, supra note 148, at 16-17.
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500 defendants released x 100 days per defendant x $180 benefit from release = $9
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Other distributional issues also exist with the benefits of bail reform. As the
Bail Reform Study repeatedly noted, the additional persons who received release
under G.O. 18.8A were disproportionately members of racial minority groups
(particularly African-Americans and Hispanics).188 But as corolllary to this point, it
is virtually certain that the costs of the additional crimes committed as the result of
the changes are not distributed evenly throughout Cook County, but rather are
heavily concentrated among minority crime victims. The victims of crime in Cook
County (and particularly violent crimes) do not mirror Cook County’s population.
On the contrary, the vast majority of the victims were racial minorities.189 For
example, of the 2018 Chicago homicide victims, 79.9% were African-American,
13.7% were Hispanic, and 5.7% were white. 190 Additionally, of the 2018 Chicago
aggravated assault and battery victims, at least 191 69.1% were African-American,
19.6% were Hispanic, and 8.9% were white. 192
A related point can be made about another commonly cited benefit of bail
reform. Proponents of expanded pretrial release have often noted that defendants
who are held pretrial are more likely to be convicted. From 1990 to 2004, 78 percent
of pretrial detainees were eventually convicted, but only 60 percent of alleged
criminals released were convicted of a crime. 193 A conventional narrative offered to
explain these differences is that defendants who are detained are less able to assist
with their defense. 194 This may, of course, may explain part of the difference; but
other explanations seem important, particularly in Cook County. As suggested by
the increased “drop” rate in domestic violence cases after G.O. 18.8A, some released
defendants take advantage of their liberty to intimidate their victims into dropping
charges. For these defendants, the lower conviction rate should not be regarded as
a social benefit but a social cost. And these costs are not distributed equally. Instead,
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the costs are concentrated among women, particularly among lower-income
minority women. 195
Another point that appears to have often been overlooked in discussions about
bail reform is that a defendant who is released pretrial will often be convicted and
then sentenced to a term of incarceration. If that defendant had been detained
pretrial, he would receive credit for time served as part of his sentence. Unless bail
reform is coupled with lower terms of imprisonment (a separate issue) the mere fact
of pretrial release does not necessarily equate with cost savings from shorter terms
of imprisonment.
For example, if one defendant is charged with armed robbery and obtains
pretrial release for six months while his case adjudicated, he might upon conviction
be sentenced to two years in prison. A defendant facing an identical charge who
does not obtain pretrial release might also ultimately be sentenced to two years in
prison, but receive credit for the six months of pretrial detention. From a cost-ofincarceration perspective, the costs of the two cases are roughly the same 196—both
defendants are incarcerated for two years. But a simplistic bail reform calculation
might calculate the cost of incarceration to be six months shorter for the second
defendant, ignoring the issue of credit for time served.
Transferring this point to the Bail Reform Study, distributional issues may
arise. If the first defendant faces two years in prison, it may be the case that the
taxpayers of Illinois pay for his incarceration in state prison. For the second
defendant, it may be the case that taxpayers in Cook County pay for his six months
of detention in jail while Illinois taxpayers pay for his eighteen months in prison. 197
Thus, from a societal point of view, while there is no difference between the costs
of the two cases, County County will claim a cost “saving” that is really merely a
cost transfer—a transfer of the cost to another set of taxpayers.
To be clear, we are fully prepared to consider arguments that shorter terms
of incarceration are cost-beneficial. Indeed, one of us (Cassell) has very publicly
criticized certain lengthy mandatory minimum sentences. 198 But the point here is that
if total terms of incarceration remain equal both before and after a bail reform, it is
not accurate to attribute cost saving to a mere transfer of expense.

See CHI. TRIB. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INVESTIGATION, supra note 123.
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As a final point, some readers may wonder whether all of this discussion of
costs and benefits is academic, because of the constitutional rights of pretrial
detainees. After all, if a defendant has a constitutional right to pretrial release, then
any debate about whether their detention is cost-beneficial is beside the point. This
brief article is not the place for an extended discussion of the constitutionality of
pretrial detention. 199 It is enough to note that many other researchers in this area
have assumed the pretrial detention can be implemented constitutionally. 200 And the
Chief Judge who promulgated G.O. 18.8A does not believe that, as currently drafted,
his Order is constitutionally required. Instead, as disclosed in the end of the Bail
Reform Study, the Chief Judge is considering modifications that might “strengthen
public safety” in connection with (for example) firearms offenses. 201 We simply
follow in that vein to consider whether other alterations of the G.O. might also be
appropriate.
Again, we emphasize we are not arguing that bail reform measures such as G.O.
18.8A will ultimately fail a rigorous cost-benefit assessment. Instead, we offer these
points as cautionary counterweights to be considered before one accepts the Bail
Reform Study’s optimistic conclusions that the 2017 changes were, indeed, costbeneficial. More careful analysis considering the points raised here is necessary
before any definitive conclusions can be reached.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article examines the conclusions of the Cook County Bail Reform Study,
which offered data suggesting that Cook County’s recent bail reform efforts
expanded pretrial release without any increase in crime. The Study’s presentation
of empirical evidence on this crucial issue regarding bail reform is
commendable. 202 But a concern about bias always lurks when an entity
implementing a reform later studies whether that reform was successful. In this case,
it appears that many dangers stemming from the Cook County court’s expansion of
pretrial release were not carefully assessed by the court’s own subsequent study.
A more careful analysis of the Study’s underlying data challenges the Study’s
upbeat conclusions. Contrary to the Study’s assertion that bail reform did not
increase crimes by pretrial releasees, its data suggest that quantifiable and significant
increases in crimes occurred. Based on reanalysis of the data, after the Cook County
courts implemented more expansive pretrial release procedures, the number of
released defendants who were charged with committing new crimes increased by
Cf. U.S. v Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding federal pretrial detention practices).
See, e.g., Baughman, supra note 148.
201
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about 45%. And, more concerning, the number of pretrial releasees who were
charged with committing new violent crimes increased by about 33%. Recent
investigations by the Chicago Tribune also raise concern about whether, after the
procedural changes, pretrial releasees committed more homicides and intimidated
more victims of aggravated domestic violence into dropping charges. We also
conservatively estimate that at least 930 additional crimes against persons were
committed by pretrial releasees in the fifteen months after the changes than in the
fifteen months before. These public safety harms call into question whether Cook
County’s bail “reform” measures were truly cost-beneficial.
These conclusions about the Cook County reform measures have broader
implications. Cook County appears to have used state-of-the-art risk assessment.
Cook County’s Public Safety Assessment tool was implemented with the assistance
of the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, which has been actively involved in bail
reform efforts across the country. The Foundation’s risk assessment instrument has
been used, in some form or another, in over 29 jurisdictions, including three statewide programs. 203 Cook County is one of the nation’s largest jurisdictions, which
appears to have diligently attempted to follow the Foundation’s recommendations.
If Cook County’s bail reforms have produced additional crimes, then many other
jurisdictions may have suffered similar harmful consequences.
We again underscore that this article does not reach definitive conclusions
about the balance of costs and benefits in Cook County. Instead, this article makes
a more limited but important point. As Cook County’s experience demonstrates,
bail reform measures are not always cost-free. Additional crimes committed against
the public are costs of such changes that policymakers must carefully consider in
reaching an ultimate cost-benefit conclusion. To be sure, such pretrial release
reforms can have significant benefits. But only if both benefits and costs are
accurately measured can a sound decision be made about which way the scales tip
and whether the “reform” was truly an improvement.
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